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11 Introduction
This paper ﬁrst establishes, and then attempts to explain, a puzzle in the behavior of capital
ﬂows from developed to developing countries. Capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries are
not only low (as emphasized by Lucas, 1990), but their allocation across countries seems to
be the opposite of the prediction of standard textbook theory. Capital does not seem to ﬂow
more to the countries that invest more in the way that a standard open economy growth
model would predict.
A standard open economy growth model predicts that other things equal, a country that
invests more should receive more capital inﬂows. This does not seem to be the case in the
data. As shown in Figure 1 the average share of net capital inﬂows in GDP over 1980-2000
seems to be, if anything, negatively correlated with the investment-to-GDP ratio in a sample
of 67 nonOECD countries.
To illustrate, Korea received virtually no net capital inﬂows although it invested one
third of its GDP on average, while in Uganda net capital inﬂows exceeded investment (3.5
percent against 2.8 percent of GDP on average). Far from being outliers, Korea and Uganda
are typical of the cross-country correlation between investment and capital inﬂows in Figure
1 (both countries are close to the regression line).
As we will show, Figure 1 is just one illustration of a range of results that point in the
same direction and are diﬃcult to explain in terms of a standard theory. If investment and
capital ﬂows were driven primarily by changes in domestic productivity (as suggested by
the development accounting literature), the countries that invest more should receive more
capital from abroad. Introducing an external credit constraint into the model can reduce the
predicted size of capital inﬂows, but cannot make capital ﬂow more towards the countries
that invest less. Thus, explaining the puzzle requires more than a neoclassical growth model
with credit frictions.
This puzzle is diﬀerent from the Lucas puzzle, which is about the small size of capital
ﬂows. Our results are not inconsistent with the Lucas puzzle: as Figure 1 shows, capital
inﬂows amount to a much smaller of GDP than investment on average (3.9 percent against
15.4 percent in our sample). We would argue that the small size of aggregate capital ﬂows
toward developing countries as a whole is not especially puzzling given the productivity
growth rates in these countries. Indeed, we will show that a calibrated model can predict
the order of magnitude of capital ﬂows to developing countries pretty well without assuming
a high level of ﬁnancial friction.
Our puzzle is related to the allocation of the capital ﬂows across developing countries
rather than their overall level. Our calibrated open economy growth model predicts capital
inﬂows to Asia that are much larger than those we observe in the data. Conversely, it predicts
relative large capital outﬂows from Latin America and Africa. This rather provocative
result reﬂects a straightforward implication of a standard open economy growth model: the
countries whose productivity declines relative to the rest of the world should export, not
impoet capital.
2Another way of presenting our puzzle is as follows. A standard model can predict level of
capital ﬂows to developing countries as a whole that are small and close to the level observed
in the data. However, such a model will predict level of capital inﬂows and outﬂows for
individual countries that are much larger than in the data.
[Robustness to decomposition. To be added.]
[Implications. to be added.]
Our paper is related to diﬀerent strands of literature. First, on the Lucas puzzle. Here
our explanation is consistent with Lucas’ original guess (capital ﬂows to poor countries are
low because these countries are not very productive). We are the ﬁrst, to our knowledge,
to quantify the level of capital ﬂows to developing countries in a calibrated open economy
growth model and compare it to the data.
Our model and calibration methods are close to the recent literature on "development
accounting" (although we do not consider human capital explicitly). This literature has
emphasized productivity growth as the main proximate cause of economic development (Hall
and Jones, 1999; Caselli, others). This view has implications for the behavior of capital ﬂows
that have not been systematically explored in the literature (by contrast with investment,
whose relationship with productivity is well understood and documented). Whether the
observed pattern of capital ﬂows to developing countries is consistent with the dominant
theory of growth is an interesting question in its own right, and might teach us one lesson
or two on the determinants of growth themselves.
Some recent papers have focused on the determinants of capital inﬂows to developing
countries. Aizenmann et al (2004) construct a self-ﬁnancing ratio indicating what would
have been the stock of capital in the absence of capital inﬂows. They ﬁnd that 90 percent of
the stock of capital in developing countries is self-ﬁnanced, and that countries with higher
self-ﬁnancing ratios grew faster in the 1990s. Manzocchi and Martin (1996) empirically test
an equation for capital inﬂows derived from an open-economy growth model on cross-section
data for 33 developing countries–and ﬁnd relatively weak support.
Structure of the paper. Section 2 will compare the predictions of a simple open economy
growth model and the data on capital ﬂows. Section 3 will look at the extent to which
the puzzle can be explained away by decomposing capital ﬂows into public and private
components, reserves accumulation, etc. Section 4 draws implications of our results for the
research on growth and on international ﬁnancial integration.
2 Capital ﬂows to developing countries: theory and
data
This section aims to provide a quantitative account of the pattern of capital ﬂows to de-
veloping countries using a simple neoclassical model. To do so, we construct a measure of
3the capital ﬂows associated with either initial capital scarcity, or a catch-up in domestic
productivity. The focus is on long term capital ﬂows, so the model abstracts from short
term ﬁnancial frictions and adjustment costs of physical capital that would inﬂuence the
dynamics of capital accumulation but not the ultimate level of the capital stock.
2.1 Benchmark model
We consider a world with one homogeneous good and a number of countries. In this world,
we focus on a subset of small and developing countries. Time is discrete and there is no
uncertainty. The population Nt grows at an exogenous rate n that is country speciﬁc:






s Nt+s u(ct+s), (1)
where ct is consumption per capita and u(c) ≡ c1−γ/(1 − γ) is a constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) instantaneous utility function with coeﬃcient γ>0. In the case where
γ =1 , the utility function is u(c)=l n( c).






where Kt denotes the stock of domestic capital, Lt is labor supply and At is a labor-
augmenting measure of productivity. The labor supply is exogenous and proportional to
population (Lt = Nt). Factor markets are perfectly competitive. Lastly, labor productivity
grows at a gross rate gt ≡ At/At−1,w h i c hm a yd i ﬀer across countries in the short run but




g∗ represents the growth rate of the world productivity frontier A∗
t.
There are no frictions to the installation of capital. We assume that there is a distortion τ
in the accumulation of capital, so that investors receive a fraction (1 − τ) of the gross return
on capital Rt, equal to α(Kt/(AtLt))
α−1 +1− δ, where δ measures the depreciation rate.
We call τ the ‘capital wedge’. This wedge allows us to account for long run cross country
diﬀerences in saving rates.†
Given the previous discussion, the country’s budget constraint is:
nk t+1 + R
∗dt = ndt+1 +( 1− τ)Rtkt + wtAt + zt − ct (3)
∗We assume further that βng∗(1−γ) < 1 so that the utility is well deﬁned.
†In order to focus on the distortive aspects of this wedge, we assume that the revenues per capita
zt = τRtkt are rebated in lump sum fashion. Hence, we can interpret the wedge τ naturally as a tax
on capital.
4where dt and kt denote respectively external debt and physical capital per capita at time t
and wt is the wage per eﬃc i e n tu n i to fl a b o r(1 − α)˜ kα.
A country is characterized by an initial capital stock per capita k0, ap o p u l a t i o ng r o w t h
rate n, an initial productivity A0 together with a productivity path {At}
∞
0 , and a capital
wedge τ. We use the model to estimate the size and the direction of capital ﬂows following
a ﬁnancial liberalization.
Financial liberalization means that domestic investors can borrow and lend at the world
interest rate R∗. We assume that the world interest rate coincides with the long-run growth
adjusted discount factor β
−1g∗γ. This implies that ﬁnancial integration does not ‘tilt’ con-
sumption proﬁles in the long run. The domestic return on investment must equal the world
real interest rate:
(1 − τ)Rt+1 = R
∗
Substituting the expression for the gross return on capital, this implies that the capital
stock per eﬃc i e n tu n i to fl a b o r˜ k = K/AL is constant:








Given our assumption on the world interest rate, the Euler equation for consumption
implies that consumption per capita grows at the constant rate g∗. Finally, the initial
level of consumption per capita c0 is determined so as to satisfy the intertemporal budget
constraint of the representative household.
2.1.1 Capital Scarcity and Convergence
Consider now the simple scenario where a country starts with an initial capital ˜ k0 below the
steady state level ˜ k∗, while productivity growth is constant and equal to g∗. Under ﬁnancial
autarky, the country would accumulate capital domestically, asymptotically reaching ˜ k∗. In
the absence of ﬁnancial frictions, the country will simply borrow ˜ k∗ − ˜ k
−
0 , the diﬀerence
between the initial and steady states capital stocks:
e d
c = ˜ k
∗ − ˜ k0. (5)
The model’s prediction is extremely simple: external debt serves to close the capital
gap. Notice that in this simple case, saving does not change since consumption adjusts
immediately to its new permanent income level.
2.1.2 Productivity Catch-Up
Consider now a situation where the country is initially in steady state, so that ˜ k0 = ˜ k∗, but
experiences a productivity catch-up relative to the world productivity frontier A∗
t between


















for t ≤ T, after which the growth rate of domestic productivity goes back to g∗. The fraction
x represents the fraction of the gap between A0 and A∗
0 that is eliminated in T years. When
x =0 , the country maintains the same relative productivity. When x =1 , the country
catches up to the world frontier in T years. Finally, when x<0, the country experiences a
relative productivity decline.












> 1 is the long-term level of πt.
Solving forward the budget constraint (3), using ct+1 = g∗ct,w eﬁnd the initial consump-
tion level per eﬃc i e n tu n i to fl a b o r :




















where χ =( 1− α)˜ k∗α + τ
1−τR∗˜ k∗ > 0.


















Substituting for ˜ c0, the debt per eﬃcient unit e dt stabilizes at:
e d




























e da represents the net cumulated capital inﬂows and provides us with our second measure of
the predicted capital ﬂows, associated this time with a productivity catch-up.
There are a few things interesting to note about equation (??). First, as expected, e da =0
if πt =1for all t. There are no capital ﬂows in the absence of productivity catch-up, since
the economy remains in a steady state with zero external debt.
Second, if there is some productivity catch-up (π>1) the ﬁrst term on the right hand
side of (??),
e d




6is positive. It represents the external borrowing that goes toward ﬁnancing domestic invest-
ment. To see this, observe that since capital per eﬃc i e n tu n i to fl a b o rremains constant
at ˜ k∗, capital per capita needs to increase. Without the productivity catch-up, capital per
capita at time T would be ˜ k∗A0g∗T.I n s t e a d ,i ti s˜ k∗AT. The diﬀerence, (π − 1)˜ k∗A0g∗T,
corresponds to the ﬁrst term. By contrast if π<1 there is a capital outﬂow.
The second term on the right-hand-side of (??) represents the change in external debt
brought about by changes in domestic saving. Faster productivity growth increases con-
sumption today and so decreases saving. The domestic agent borrows on the international
















Note that a country in relative productivity decline (πt >π ) will tend to export capital
because of consumption smoothing. The representative resident mitigates the relative decline
in his future consumption by investing abroad.
It is important to emphasize that diﬀerent theories have diﬀerent implications for the
aggregate relationship between saving and growth. In Modigliani’s original life cycle model,
faster growth increases aggregate savings by increasing the saving of richer young cohorts
relative to the dissaving of poorer older cohorts. In the neoclassical growth model, faster
growth tends to depress saving (consumption smoothing) while more saving will increase
growth temporarily. The empirical literature does ﬁnd that faster growth is associated with
more saving, and the consensus view is that the causality runs from growth to saving (see
Carroll and Weil (XX)) and not the reverse. We recognize that the implications of our
benchmark model in terms of saving might not be robust. Hence, we would put less weight
on the contribution of e ds than that of e di in our prediction of capital ﬂows. One can interpret
e di as the cumulated capital inﬂows that would arise in a model with a collateral constraint on
international borrowing stipulating that capital inﬂows cannot exceed physical investment:
Dt − Dt−1 ≤ Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1.
2.2 Predicted capital ﬂows
The previous section discusses two components of predicted cumulated capital inﬂows: e dc
in response to initial capital scarcity and e da following a productivity catch-up. We quantify
each component by calibrating the model using data from the Penn World tables (PWT).
T a b l e1r e p o r t st h ev a l u e so ft h ep a r a m e t e r so ft h em o d e l .W ea s s u m et h a tt h eU . S .e c o n o m y
remains on the world productivity frontier. Accordingly, we set g∗ =1 .012, in line with U.S.
long-run multifactor productivity growth. We also assume that the capital share is constant
across countries, and equal to 0.3.‡ We assume a rate of depreciation of physical capital equal
‡Recent estimates by ? suggest that the capital share is roughly constant within countries, and varies
between 0.2 and 0.4 across countries.
7βγ αδ k g∗
0.96 1 0.3 0.06 1.012
Table 1: Common parameters
to 6 percent per annum as in ?. We also assume logarithmic preferences, with a discount
factor of 0.96. Given these values, the world real interest rate is equal to R∗ − 1=5 .42
percent.
Our sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 79 non OECD countries between the 1970
and 2000. We ﬁrst construct estimates of the capital stock per capital kt using investment
rates from PWT and a perpetual inventory method as in Bernanke and G˝ urkaynak (2001).
Given estimates of output per capita yt from PWT, we infer the productivity level as At =
(yt/kα
t )
1/(1−α) . Our measure of the catch-up in productivity π is constructed as exp(ln ¯ AT −
ln ¯ A0)/g∗T where ln ¯ At is obtained from a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter of lnAt. This ﬁltering
removes short term ﬂuctuations in productivity.
We construct the steady state capital level ˜ k∗ from equation (4). The only unknown
quantity in this equation is the capital wedge τ.
We construct an estimate of τ by observing that under perfect ﬁnancial integration, the
average investment rate to GDP is given by
¯ sk =
α(δ + n¯ g − 1)
R∗/(1 − τ)+δ − 1
,
where ¯ g is the average growth rate of productivity over the period. When productivity growth
is constant at g∗, this reduces to the usual formula for the investment rate in steady state:
s∗
k =( δ + ng∗ − 1)˜ k1−α. In our model, faster productivity growth increases the investment
rate above s∗
k.
Inverting, we obtain the capital wedge as a function of the average investment rate and
the average productivity growth rate:
τ =1−
R∗
α(δ + n¯ g − 1)/¯ sk +1− δ
(6)
We measure ¯ sk as the average investment rate between 1970 and 2000, and ¯ g as the
average gross growth rate of the Solow residual At [non-ﬁltered?].
Our approach to constructing τ is valid if countries are perfectly integrated. When this is
not the case, our estimates of the contribution of capital scarcity and productivity catch-up to
capital ﬂows are likely to be biased. To see in which direction the bias goes, assume that the
saving rate is decreasing with capital scarcity. [CHECK WITH BARRO SALA-I-MARTIN:
I think this is the case with logs, or perhaps it is constant then. Even better!!]
8For a capital scarce country, the investment rate should be higher than in steady state.
This would lead us to overerestimate the steady state capital stock, and overestimate the
contribution to capital inﬂows due to both capital scarcity and productivity catch-up.
For a capital abundant country, the observed saving rate should be lower than in steady
state. This would lead us to underestimate the steady state capital stock and the contribution
of productivity catch-up, and overestimate the contribution of capital abundance to capital
outﬂows.
Data on ˜ k∗ and π allow us to construct e da and its components e di and e ds according to
(??), as well as e dc according to (5). One can also construct the increase in the capital stock
predicted by the model. Table [] reports the regional totals, in billions of 1996 international
dollars over the period 1980-2000. A few points are worth making.
First, the model does a very good job at predicting the increase in the capital stock over
the period. The increase observed in the data, ∆kr, is remarkably close to the level predicted
by the model, ∆kp, both in agrregate and across regions. This success may not come as a
surprise, given that the productivity changes have been calibrated based on the changes in
the capital stock in the data.
Columns 3 to 7 show how well the model performs in predicting capital ﬂows. The model
predicts that our sample of countries, taken as a whole, should have imported 2.34 trillions
constant dollars, or 13 percent of the capital it accumulated during the period (see column
dt). The total level of capital ﬂo w sp r e d i c t e db yt h em o d e li so ft h es a m eo r d e ro fm a g n i t u d e
as the level observed in the data (compare dt and dr). The model solves the Lucas puzzle,
and furthermore provides an explanation for why the capital inﬂows should not be expected
to be a large fraction of capital accumulation. On average, developing countries do not
catch up with the US in terms of producitivity. Thus the productivity component is a small
fraction of total capital ﬂows (it is in fact negative, i.e., the model predicts a small capital
outﬂow because of productivity changes). Most of the capital inﬂows are the result of initial
capital scarcity, which is not a very large fraction of total capital accumulation.
The model performs much more poorly to explain the allocation of capital ﬂows across
regions. It predicts that Asia should have received much more capital inﬂows than it did
in the data, while Africa and Latin America export capital. Our results point in the same
direction whether or not we include the consumption smoothing component. If we exclude
it (a reasonable assumption, given that it magniﬁes the ﬂo w st om a g n i t u d e st h a tm a ys e e m
implausible) we ﬁnd that Asia should have imported 3.2 trillion dollars, that is 24 percent
of its capital accumulation. By contrast, Latin America and Africa should have exported
respectively 17 percent and 50 percent of their capital accumulation in capital outlows.
This reﬂects a relative productivity decline in both regions (and initial capital abundance in
Africa).
We look at the model’s ability to predict capital accumulation and capital ﬂows across
countries (as opposed to across regions) by comparing the average to GDP ratios in the
model and in the data (the metric we used in the introduction, see Figure 1). As shown in
Figure [.], the model does a good job of explaining the average investment to GDP ratio. By
9Predicted Capital Flows ∆kr ∆kp br bc ba of which: bt bti Obs.
(bn of 1996 intl’ dollar) bi bs
Non-OECD countries 16,758 17,036 -2,097 -2,445 104 218 -114 -2,341 -2,227 65
Low Income 3,232 3,383 -1,192 -608 -607 -22 -585 -1,215 -630 23
Lower Middle Income 8,523 8,024 -82 -666 -2,167 -387 -1,780 -2,833 -1,053 23
Upper Middle Income 2,749 2,943 -970 -788 4,044 1,027 3,018 3,256 238 14
High Income (Non-OECD) 2,254 2,687 148 -383 -1,167 -400 -766 -1,549 -783 5
Africa 884 935 -306 82 2,412 389 2,023 2,494 471 30
Latin-America 2,752 2,970 -1,318 -858 5,477 1,356 4,121 4,619 498 21
Asia 13,122 13,131 -473 -1,669 -7,786 -1,527 -6,259 -9,455 -3,196 14
except China and India 9,340 10,454 -2,280 -2,292 6,262 1,218 5,045 3,971 -1,074 63
China and India 7,418 6,582 183 -153 -6,159 -1,000 -5,159 -6,312 -1,153 2
Table 2: Predicted and Actual Capital Flows between 1980 and 2000, billions of 1996 inter-
national dollars.
contrast, Figure [.], which plots the data against the model prediction for the average capital
inﬂow to GDP ratio, conﬁrms how poorly the model does at explaining capital inﬂows. The
regression coeﬃcient is not only diﬀerent from 1 but it is negative (signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level). The capital ﬂows predicted by the model are negatively correlated with the data.§
Figures [.] and [.] shed some light on the source of the discrepancy by looking at the
relationship between capital inﬂows and productivity growth in the model and in the data.
The calibrated model predicts a strongly positive correlation between average productivity
growth and the average ratio of investment to GDP. This correlation is signiﬁcantly negative
in the data. Taken together, these two ﬁndings explain the paradoxical correlation shown in
Figure 1 in the introduction. Countries with higher productivity growth have both a higher
investment to GDP ratio and a lower capital inﬂows to GDP ratio. This is the opposite of
the correlation predicted by the model.
(note: replace b by d and change the signs: to be done)
3 Decomposing capital ﬂows
As a matter of accounting, the current account is a measure of the domestic savings that ﬂow
abroad. This savings ﬂow, however, can take various and sometimes very diﬀerent forms:
FDI, aid and transfers, remittances, IMF loans, accumulation of reserves by the central bank,
etc.. Can we identify ﬂows that seem to account more than others for the puzzling allocation
of capital ﬂows across countries that we uncovered in the previous section? We present a
methodology by which this question can be addressed, and then apply it to the available
data.
Empirically, there are two (closely related) ways to proceed (closely related):
§This result is robust when one looks at the correlation between the model predicted values and the data
inside regions.
101. establish the correlations between productivity growth and the average components of
the ﬂows as a share of GDP
2. establish the correlations between productivity growth and the cumulated levels of the
diﬀerent components
3.1 A Decomposition of capital ﬂows
One distinction that we expect to be signiﬁcant is whether the source and the recipient of
the capital ﬂow are public or private. Table 4 below decomposes capital ﬂows into four
components according to this criterion: public-to-public, public-to-private, private-to-public
and private-to-private. The ﬁrst upper index refers to the source, with p denoting the private
sector and g denoting the governmental (or public) sector. The second upper index refers to
the recipient sector with similar notations. For example, KFpg denotes the volume capital
ﬂows going from foreign private investors to the domestic public sector. The change in
reserves is included in the public-to-public category, since it is a change in the domestic




source public KFgg KFpg
private KFpg KFpp
We would expect the predictions of the textbook neoclassical model to apply the most to
the capital ﬂows in the private-to-private category (FDI, portfolio ﬂows etc.). Capital ﬂows
that involve the government are a diﬀerent story. For example, one would not necessarily
expect the countries that have invested the most to be also those where the government
has issued the largest quantity of debt abroad. Similarly, multilateral and bilateral loans
do not necessarily go in priority to the countries that invest the most. Many of these loans
are meant to ﬁnance productive investment in developing countries, but often giving some
priority to the countries that have problems attracting the funds of private investors.
We use the balance-of-payments data available from the World Bank’s Global Develop-
ment Finance (GDF) data set. This data set covers 136 developing countries from 1970 to
the present. The appendix explains in details how we estimate the diﬀerent capital ﬂow com-
ponents based on the GDF data. One problem with the GDF data is that they are not netted
of the foreign assets accumulated by the domestic public and private sectors. Hence, this
data set does not provide a complete breakdown of the balance-of-payments equation (??).
Nevertheless, this problem can be solved if we are willing to assume that the only foreign
assets accumulated by the domestic public sector are foreign exchange reserves. Conditional
on this assumption it is possible to derive the net ﬂows to the private sector as a residual in
11Capital Flows Components dr FDI RES KFpp KFpg KFgg KFg KFp Obs
(bn of 1996 international dollar)
Non-OECD countries 2,118 2,300 1,785 4,304 1,049 1,356 620 1,494 54
Low Income 1,088 137 326 413 153 649 476 612 20
Lower Middle Income 145 1,296 1,020 2,234 536 542 58 88 19
Upper Middle Income 977 797 273 1,458 353 129 210 763 14
High Income (Non-OECD) -93 70 167 199 7 36 -124 31 1
Africa 281 69 113 185 41 244 173 108 22
Latin-America 1,268 808 232 1,455 387 202 356 908 20
Asia 569 1,423 1,440 2,664 622 910 91 477 12
except China and India 2,301 1,286 904 2,531 578 1,030 705 1,592 52
India -183 1,014 882 1,773 471 326 -84 -98 2
Table 3: Predicted Capital Flows between 1970 and 2000, billions of 1996 international
dollars.
the balance-of-payments equation. This gives us (by construction) an exact decomposition of
the current account balance in terms of net ﬂows to the domestic public sector and private
sector. One drawback of this decomposition is that it contains no information about the
source of the ﬂows.
Note: we have
d







4D i s c u s s i o n
Depending on how far we go in explaining the puzzle with reserves and public capital ﬂows,
we might devote more or less eﬀort to thinking about explanations that deviates more from
the neoclassical model of growth, by making productivity endogenous. In particular,
• Could this be about export-led growth based on a depreciated real exchange rate?
(Productivity growth is an increasing function of gross exports, and the current account is a
byproduct of the depreciated real exchange rate. This could be tested by controling for the
level of the real exchange rate.)
• Could this be an infant industry argument applied to the domestic ﬁnancial sector?
(Protection leading to development of domestic ﬁnancial sector leading to increase in domes-





GDF reports gross capital ﬂows. When it calls them “net” this just means that loans are
n e to fr e p a y m e n t s .B u tt h i si sg r o s si nt h em a c r o e c o n o m i cs e n s e :i tr e p o r t st h ea c c u m u l a t i o n
of claims on residents by nonresidents, but not of claims on nonresidents by residents. Also,
GDF includes only long-term credit ﬂows with a maturity longer than one year.
The capital ﬂows can be decomposed by originators and recipients as follows,
KFpp =Foreign Direct Investment + Portfolio Equity Flows + Net Flows on Private
NonGuaranteed (PNG) Debt
KFpg =Net Flows on Public and Publicly Guaranteed (PPG) Debt from Private Credi-
tors
KFgg =Net Flows on PPG Debt from Oﬃcial Creditors+ IMF Purchases -IMF repur-
chases.
GDF does not report ﬂows from foreign public lenders to the domestic private sector
(KFgp). This is so even though some loans from the World Bank and regional development
banks go to private borrowers, because these loans are publicly guaranteed and so fall in the
PPG category.
FKgg is close to the GDF concept of "oﬃcial net resource ﬂows", which is equal to net
ﬂows on PPG debt (oﬃcial creditors)+Grants. The diﬀerence is that FKgg does not include
grants but includes IMF loans. The GDF concept of "private net resource ﬂows" corresponds
to FKpp + FKpg.
One problem with this decomposition is that it refers to gross ﬂows. So these ﬂows do
not add up to the change in reserves minus the current account. This problem can be solved
if one does the breakdown by recipient sector (and not by the sources), conditional on some
assumptions. Let us denote by KFg and KFp the net ﬂows to the domestic public and
private sectors respectively. If one assumes that the only foreign assets that are purchased
or sold by the domestic public sector are foreign exchange reserves, then the net ﬂows to the












14where the change in reserves does not appear because it is counted in KFg.This equation
can be used to estimate KF
p
t , using the data for the other variables in GDF.
GDF provides data expressed in current US dollars. These data must be converted into
constant international dollars in order to be comparable to the Penn World Table data that
we used to compute I, S and CA. IWe have to make an assumption on the relative price
that we use to go from dollars to international dollars (both current). If the ﬂows clearly
refer to investment–for example to compute intertemporal FDI–we could use the price of
investment.
O t h e r w i s ew eh a v eu s e dt h ep r i c eo fG D P ,P (this is what we did for the diﬀerence between
GNP and GDP in order to compute GNP). We also mentioned the possibility of taking a
price of 1, i.e. assume that the values of the BOP components were the same in current
international dollars as in current dollars (on the grounds that the current account relates to
traded goods). The formula to convert current into international dollars is Ei$
t =1 0 0 E$
t/Pt
in the ﬁrst case, and Ei$
t = E$
t in the second one.
Then current international dollars have to be converted into constant ones. Here we











t is the value in current dollars, Eci$
t the value in constant international dollars, and
RGDPLt and CGDPt are taken from the PWT.
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Figure 5: Actual Capital Inﬂows/GDP and Productivity Growth, 1980-2000
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